The Africa Trade Network (ATN) - uniting hundreds NGOs, trade union and other labour organizations, faith-based, women’s and other networks and social movements across the entire African continent- considers this package to be manipulative, deceptive and potentially divisive on the following grounds

This package is manipulative

A similar device was utilized by the EU and the US in order to ‘clinch’ the Uruguay Round in 1994. In answer to the reservations of many developing countries, and in supposed compensation for the negative effects of their heavy undertakings in that round, the majors made many promises and aid undertakings to LDCs and other developing countries, such as the Net Food Importing Developing Countries.

These and other promises have not been fulfilled. African and other developing countries continue, to this day, to carry the burdens of the undertakings they made in the UR. They continue to struggle for their development needs and rights to be recognized in the WTO. We cannot allow this latest package of aid promises to be used once again as a device to ‘clinch’ another package of imbalanced agreements, on agriculture, services, industrial and other areas of liberalization in this so-called Doha Development Round

This package is deceptive

On each of the five main components of this package we note the following

 Cotton ‘compensations’- The US government offer of financial compensation, technical assistance and ‘market access’ for African cotton farmers is a totally inadequate response to the enormously damaging effects upon millions of these farmers caused by US government subsidies to its cotton farmers. The most fundamental response has to be the prompt removal of these divisive and damaging (and WTO-illegal) US subsidies.

 Duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs - The US and EU say they will open up their markets to all products of all LDCs, but these are unilateral decisions and non-binding offers and will be manipulated as required by them. The only effective DFQF provisions are those that are enforceable in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. As such, DFQF must be bound in the scheduled commitments scheduled of the developed countries offering such market access. Developing countries also require preferential, clear and transparent rules of origin and clear anti-dumping rules and measures. In any case, these offers only ameliorate but do not comprehensively address the more fundamental productive incapacities of developing countries to take advantage of market openings.

 ‘Preferences assistance’ - The unilateral offers of financial assistance to those countries affected by the erosion of their preferential access in their main export markets must not be held hostage to other ambitions in the WTO negotiations. Developing countries require a specific carve out solution to the problem of Preference Erosion. The financial solution to this must not be outsourced to other bilateral and/or multilateral initiatives but must be explicitly resolved in the WTO by means of a clear identification of products that are vulnerable to preference erosion, and their treatment as sensitive products exempt from further liberalization such as restrictive quotas.

 TRIPS ‘concessions’ - The transitional period conceded to LDCs to implement the provisions of this agreement falls far short of what these countries require and have demanded. Their demand to be enabled to protect and promote indigenous/traditional knowledge and their own biodiversity has also been largely ignored. Instead, conditions have been attached to the extension which prevents them from adopting any measures on intellectual property unless they are in greater compliance with TRIPS provisions. The conditions will also enable developed countries to prescribe how developing countries protect and enforce international intellectual property rights. This makes a complete mockery of the transitional period. The conditionalities attached to the TRIPS extension must be rejected.

 ‘Aid for trade’ - Experience has shown such aid is always inadequate and manipulated to gain policy influence and control for the aid-givers. This offer, too, is not so much to develop their trade capacities but in exchange for and to advance trade liberalization. This is a device to get African countries to undertake trade liberalizations that they are currently resisting. Once again, aid is on offer to them as ‘compensation’ for the ‘adjustment costs’ that will be entailed in their making offers and compromises in the current Doha negotiations. Such quantitative assistance cannot balance the qualitative losses that will be entailed in the further narrowing of the policy space and economic prospects within their countries as a result of further liberalization undertakings.

This package is potentially divisive

By singling out specific countries within Africa and elsewhere, these offers select some of the more high-profile problems afflicting these countries but ignores many other, equally legitimate, problems in the WTO that affect all developing countries. But this package is, in fact, also deliberately aimed at undermining the cooperation and unity of African countries, and solidarity between Africa and other developing countries.

The positive cooperation amongst the G90 countries during the last WTO ministerial in Cancun was evidence of the vital importance of their unity in counter-balancing the power of the majors and other more developed countries in the WTO. Similarly, in this ministerial in Hong Kong, the G90+ are proving to be the most important alliance to defend the shared interests of the developing countries Thus their unity and cooperation must not be undermined by this latest divisive initiative of the major powers.

The ATN calls on LDC, African and other developing countries not to be pressured or persuaded into accepting the majors’ so-called Development Package that will increase their vulnerability to the manipulations and deceptions of the major trading powers in the Hong Kong.